Several airline consolidation events have recently been completed both in Europe and in the United States. The model we develop considers two airlines operating hub-and-spoke networks, using di¤erent hubs to connect the same spoke airports.
Introduction
The global airline industry is currently undergoing a major process of consolidation. In particular, the US market is experiencing its second wave of consolidation since the deregulation of the US airline industry in 1977, while the European market is experiencing its …rst wave of mergers since the gradual liberalization of the EU airline market was completed in 1997. Globally, the industry is coming under the increasing domination of the three global alliances (Oneworld, Star Alliance, and SkyTeam). The most recent high-pro…le events on the European market include the Air France-KLM merger, Lufthansa's acquisition of Swiss International Airlines and Austrian Airlines, and British Airways'mergers with Iberia and BMI. On the other side of the Atlantic, Delta Air Lines purchased Northwest Airlines, and United Airlines merged with Continental Airlines. In each of these cases, the partners to the merger operated hub-and-spoke networks, sometimes featuring multiple hubs.
After consolidation, the airlines are expected to reorganize ‡ight frequencies in their joint hub-and-spoke networks. This paper focuses on the e¤ects of airline consolidation on the distribution of tra¢ c between primary and secondary hubs, taking into account the impact of congestion at the partners'airports. The question of the impact of airport congestion on an airline's network choice is important and complex. The complexity of the matter lies in the trade-o¤ between the e¢ ciency a hub-and-spoke operator gains by consolidating most of its tra¢ c in a single hub, and the eventual increased congestion that may result in losses to the airline and its passengers alike.
Airline consolidation can involve di¤erent types of agreements across the companies depending on the extent of their integration. The literature on airline consolidation, which distinguishes between alliances and mergers, is surprisingly not very extensive. Brueckner analysis indicate that, following the merger, Delta Air Lines increased its reliance on the Atlanta and Salt Lake City hubs (Atlanta being the main hub in Delta's network, and Salt Lake City being Delta's regional hub in the western United States). We also found some evidence consistent with the declining importance of other hub airports (in particular, all of Northwest Airlines'former hubs) in the joint network.
The increased importance of Atlanta and Salt Lake City following the merger con…rms the predictions of our modeling exercise. After consolidation, Delta became less dependent on what prior to the merger had been its least reliable hubs (most notably, New York JFK and Northwest Airlines'former hubs). Since our post-merger period coincides with a period of generally lower demand for air travel (and one that as a result is associated with more reliable air services), it is not easy to determine whether and to what extent any post-merger congestion build-up at the airports in Atlanta and Salt Lake City airports might have contributed to the diversion of some tra¢ c to Delta's secondary hubs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is presented in Section 2 and the empirical analysis is reported in Section 3. A brief conclusion closes the paper. The proofs of the theoretical model can be consulted in the Appendix.
2 The model
Pre-consolidation scenario
Before the merger, each airline operates a simple hub-and-spoke network, as shown in Fig. 1.
Insert Fig. 1 here It is assumed that the only relevant demand is in the city-pair market AB, which is served by two vertically-di¤erentiated airlines. This theoretical model is derived from the literature on vertical product di¤erentiation, initiated by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Sutton (1982 and 1983) and summarized by Tirole (1988) . Consumer utility is given by f p, where f is product quality and p is price. 6 Consumer heterogeneity arises from di¤erent valuations of product quality ( ).
Applying this setting to the airline industry, product quality is assumed to be ‡ight frequency, and prices can be considered as airfares. Various studies (see, for example, Brueckner and Flores-Fillol, 2007) consider ‡ight frequency to be the best proxy to service quality, as a higher frequency increases passengers'travel opportunities. Indeed, regional services (addressed primarily to business travelers) typically o¤er high frequencies at high fares, whereas low-cost connections (addressed primarily to leisure travelers) typically o¤er low frequencies at low fares. 7 More speci…cally, we assume utilities to be U 1 = f 1 p 1 and U 2 = f 2 p 2 , where 2 [1; z] and z > 2, with z being a measure of preference dispersion. At this juncture, we assume airline 1 to be characterized by a lower quality of service, which is o¤ered at lower fares. Therefore, both f 2 > f 1 > 0 and p 2 > p 1 > 0 hold. Denoting d = f 2 f 1 > 0 the service quality gap and assuming fully-served markets, the indi¤erent consumer's valuation of service quality is given by 0 =
, as depicted in Fig. 2 .
Travelers with a low valuation of service quality purchase the lower-quality product (i.e., product 1) and travelers with a high valuation of service quality purchase the higher-quality product (i.e., product 2). This framework corresponds to the situation prevailing between Delta and Northwest before the merger, with Delta o¤ering a larger network and richer connectivity possibilities at its hubs (above all in Atlanta -the world's largest airport by passenger volume). Since markets are fully-served, then U 1 ( = 1) > 0 and U 2 ( = 0 ) > 0 require f 1 > p 1 and , demands are given by
where H > 0 stands for market size. Note that d 6 p 2 p 1 6 dz is assumed to ensure nonnegative quantities. A consequence of having fully-served markets is that either a higher quality gap (d) or a lower fare gap (i.e., p 2 p 1 ) imply a higher relative tra¢ c volume (i.e., q 2 q 1 ). It can be observed that q 1 decreases with d whereas q 2 increases with d. total tra¢ c on a given route by the number of planes. 9 Note that the cost per seat, which can be written q 1 =s 2 1 + , visibly decreases with s 1 capturing the presence of economies of tra¢ c density (i.e., economies from operating a larger aircraft) that are unequivocal in the airline industry. Now let us consider airline congestion costs. Note that the level of congestion experienced by carrier 1 on a route (either AH or BH) is attributable to aircraft movements both at the hub airport (2f 1 ), and at the spoke airport (f 1 + f 2 ). As a consequence, airline 1's congestion costs on a route are given by (3f 1 + f 2 ) with > 0 being the congestion damage. Thus, a ‡ight's operating costs on a route is f 1 + s 1 + (3f 1 + f 2 ). Therefore, carrier 1's total cost from operating on a route is f 1 [ f 1 + s 1 + (3f 1 + f 2 )] or, equivalently,
Thus, airline 1's pro…t is 1 = p 1 q 1 2c 1 , and it can be rewritten as 1 = (p 1 2 ) q 1
, indicating that variable costs are independent of the number of ‡ights, and that the city-pair market AB is a connecting market that is served making use of two routes. The corresponding expressions for carrier 2 are derived simply by interchanging subscripts 1 and 2. This model is used to study the e¤ect on fares, frequencies, and travel volumes of a consolidation process involving carriers 1 and 2.
Since fares can be adjusted more readily than frequencies, the model is solved sequentially, with ‡ight frequency being selected before fares. 10 In this way, fares are chosen in a second stage conditional on frequencies, while frequencies are chosen in a …rst stage taking into account their impact on fares in the second stage. The outcome is a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proceeding by backwards induction, we solve the second stage of the game in which the airlines choose p 1 and p 2 as functions of f 1 and f 2 . After plugging Eqs. (1) and (2) 
, and (4)
which show that fares are strategic complements. Note that p 2 + 2 > d needs to be assumed to ensure p 1 > 0. From Eqs. (4) and (5), we obtain the following second-stage equilibrium fares
These equilibrium fares impose a mark-up over the marginal cost. The following lemma arises from the fare di¤erence
.
Lemma 1
The airline that o¤ers higher-quality services sets higher fares, and the fare di¤erence p 2 p 1 increases with the service quality gap (d). In addition, p 2 p 1 rises with preference dispersion (z) since more heterogeneous consumers require more di¤erentiated fares.
By inspection of Eqs. (1) and (2) together with the fare di¤erence p 2 p 1 , it can be seen that the direct e¤ect of d on q 1 and q 2 is o¤set by its indirect e¤ect through the fare di¤erence. As a consequence, tra¢ c volumes are independent of ‡ight frequencies in equilibrium. Thus, after plugging Eqs. (6) and (7) into Eqs. (1) and (2), we obtain
H, and (8)
where superscript n denotes the pre-consolidation scenario. We can verify that q n 2 q n 1 > 0, which is a direct consequence of d > 0 because a higher ‡ight frequency typically results in a higher tra¢ c volume.
Using Eqs. (6) and (7) and d = f 2 f 1 , we obtain the airlines'…rst-stage pro…t functions
which become functions of just f 1 and f 2 . The …rst term in the expressions is the margin, which is larger for airline 2, given that p 2 > p 1 and q n 2 > q n 1 . By inspection of Eq. (10), it can be veri…ed that @ 1 =@f 1 < 0. Therefore, airline 1 will choose the minimum possible f 1 (corner solution). Given that markets are fully-served, this value of f 1 will be the one making U 1 ( = 1) = 0, as shown in Fig. 2 . This implies that f 1 = p 1 and therefore airline 1's reaction function is
From @ 2 =@f 2 = 0, 12 we obtain the remaining reaction function, 13 which is given by
The reaction functions have di¤erent slopes and yield a stable equilibrium outcome, 14 which allows us to compute the equilibrium service quality gap, which is
and H > H 1 36 (z 1)(7 +2 ) (2z 1) 2 is required to ensure d n > 0. 15 To illustrate the properties of the equilibrium, we undertake a comparative-static analysis, which is summarized in the lemma that follows. On the one hand, the above lemma suggests that an increase in costs (marginal seat cost, …xed cost, and congestion damage) has a more marked impact on the quality of carrier 2 and, as a consequence, the quality gap becomes narrower. On the other hand, larger and more disperse markets both have a positive impact on the service quality gap. These results seem to be driven by the fact that airline 2 operates more ‡ights and has a higher tra¢ c volume.
Substituting in the second-stage choice variables, we can compute p n 1 , p n 2 , 16 and
which is obviously positive as long as H > H 1 .
Finally, in line with Shaked and Sutton (1983) , we can verify that in the case of minimum preference dispersion, intense fare competition drives the low service quality airline out of the market, i.e., when z = 2, the equilibrium fare for airline 1 is p n 1 = 2 and thus q n 1 = 0 and n 1 < 0. Therefore, z determines the number of airlines operating in the industry and, hence, the intensity of competition (regardless of demand size and …xed costs). 17 
Post-consolidation scenario
We model a consolidation process involving carriers 1 and 2 by assuming they are able to make joint decisions regarding ‡ight frequencies, whereas their fares are determined independently. We use the following arguments to justify this model structure. A setup permitting joint fare and frequency setting does not enable us to obtain closed-form solutions and, 18 at the same time, we can invoke Economides (1999) result indicating that an integrated …rm will be able to produce a higher quality product when coordinating both quality and price than when only coordinating quality. This means that cooperation on both fares and frequencies would yield an even higher frequency after consolidation than is implied by our model, and so our results would be qualitatively similar. 19 Thus, the second stage of the game remains as in the pre-consolidation scenario, i.e., q 
and again it can be veri…ed that @ 12 =@f 1 < 0, meaning that the optimal f 1 is obtained as a corner solution (i.e., f 1 = p 1 ). Consequently, we obtain the same reaction function for airline 1 as in the pre-consolidation scenario (see Eq. (12)). From @ 12 =@f 2 = 0, 20 we obtain the remaining reaction function, which is given by
The equilibrium frequencies are obtained from these reaction. 21 The equilibrium service quality gap is therefore
and
is required to ensure d c > 0. 22 The comparative-static analysis in the post-consolidation case shows the same e¤ects as in the pre-consolidation scenario (i.e., see Lemma 2), except for the higher minimum z that is required to have a quality gap that increases with preference dispersion.
Lemma 3
Assuming H > H 2 , the quality gap (d) falls with an increase in the congestion damage ( ), the …xed ‡ight cost ( ), or the marginal seat cost ( ). The quality gap rises with an increase in preference dispersion (z) with z > 2:9 or market size (H).
Finally, substituting in the second-stage choice variables, we can compute p 23 and
which is obviously positive as long as H > H 2 .
As in the pre-consolidation scenario, the consolidated …rm would stop providing low quality services in the case of minimum preference dispersion (i.e., z = 2).
In the light of these results, we can compare the pre-and post-consolidation scenarios and study the e¤ect of the parameters of the model in such comparisons.
Comparison
In this subsection we …rst assess the e¤ects of airline consolidation by comparing ‡ight frequencies and fares in the two scenarios outlined above. We then analyze the impact of congestion damage on the results of these comparisons.
Let us denote
, and
. By observing these di¤erences, it can be seen that all of them are positive for H > H 3
and z > 3. Let us denote H = max fH 1 ; H 2 ; H 3 g the required lower bound for market size ensuring comparable results between the two scenarios. Then the following lemma summarizes thes results of these comparisons.
Lemma 4
Assuming H > H and z > 3, both ‡ight frequencies and fares increase after consolidation.
This result indicates that, in a vertically-di¤erentiated market, airline consolidation seems to produce an up-market movement, providing higher quality services at higher fares.
Equivalently, we de…ne
. 25 The proposition below shows that the quality gap and the fare gap also increase after consolidation for H > H and z > 3.
Proposition 1
Assuming H > H and z > 3, both the quality gap and the fare gap increase after consolidation, i.e., d > 0 and
This proposition suggests that the di¤erentiation between high and low quality air services is accentuated after consolidation, and more ‡ights are channeled via the higher service-quality routing.
Having explained the e¤ects of airline consolidation, we now shift our attention to the analysis of congestion in order to determine its impact on the reorganization of fares and ‡ight frequencies after consolidation. Thus, we compute the derivative of the above di¤erentials with respect to the congestion damage ( ). It can be veri…ed that
, and @ p2 =@ < 0 for z > 3, as summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Assuming z > 3, then f 1 (and thus p 1 ), f 2 , and p 2 fall with an increase in congestion damage ( ).
We know from Lemma 4 that both ‡ight frequencies and fares increase after consolidation. However, Lemma 5 suggests that this up-market movement is mitigated in presence of congestion. Finally, to determine the e¤ect of congestion on consolidation processes, we need to know the e¤ect of congestion damage on d and p 2 p 1 . The proposition below
Proposition 2 Assuming z > 3, both d and p 2 p 1 fall with an increase in congestion damage ( ).
Although congestion moderates the increase in fares and frequencies on both routings following consolidation, Proposition 2 shows that the impact is more marked on the higher service-quality routing. This being the case, an increase in congestion damage mitigates the increase of the quality gap and the fare gap after consolidation. Thus, congestion may serve to prevent the concentration of ‡ight frequency on the higher service-quality routing after consolidation by creating incentives to use the poorer service-quality connection more intensively.
The empirical analysis that follows uses the results of the theoretical model developed in this section to examine the reorganization of the joint network operated by Delta Air
Lines and Northwest Airlines following the merger between the two carriers.
3 The empirical analysis
Delta-Northwest merger
The Delta-Northwest consolidation presents a very good case for the empirical application While strategic decision-making regarding the airline's operations have been moved to Atlanta (the location of Delta Air Lines headquarters), 26 it took some time for the two airlines to completely integrate. Speci…cally, Delta and Northwest's operating certi…cates were not merged until 31 December 2009, the date on which Northwest ceased to operate as a separate carrier.
Data
We examine network restructuring following a merger by evaluating the post-merger changes in the frequency of services to Delta and Northwest's hub airports. A hub operator makes service-frequency decisions on individual segments involving a hub airport (e.g., Los Angeles to Atlanta) based on expected tra¢ c from the airport of origin to end-points beyond the hub (e.g., Los Angeles to points such as Charleston, SC via Atlanta). The frequency decisions are made by taking into account both the expected demand on these routes, Insert Table 1 here Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the aforementioned sample variables. It can be seen that all the variables present su¢ cient variability given that the standard deviation is high in relation to the mean values. As we can see, an average service in our sample features four daily ‡ights, with about half of the services operated more frequently than that. Over half of the markets in our sample are monopolies, which is not unusual for the non-stop routes in the US airline industry (see Peteraf and Reed, 1994) . Furthermore, the routes tend to be highly concentrated, as illustrated by a mean HHI close to 0:90.
Finally, it is worth noting that the endpoints tend to be highly populous cities.
As we stated above, our analysis focuses on the following hub airports: Atlanta (ATL), Cincinnati (CVG), New York (JFK), and Salt Lake City (SLC) in the case of Delta; and Detroit (DTW), Memphis (MEM), and Minneapolis (MSP) in the case of Northwest. Some discussion of the di¤erences across these hubs is therefore required, especially as we are interested in addressing the question of di¤erences in congestion at these airports before the merger took place.
Insert Table 2 here Table 2 provides the relevant numbers for these hub airports in the period just prior to To evaluate di¤erences in levels of congestion across the seven hub airports, we use the percentage of on-time arrivals at those gateways, as reported by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS, US Department of Transportation). 29 The numbers reported in Table   2 are the mean annual percentage of on-time arrivals at each airport and include all the domestic services of airlines operating in that airport. From Table 2 , it can be seen that JFK appears to be the most congested of the seven hubs, whereas Memphis and Salt Lake City are the least congested airports. 
Estimation methodology
To evaluate Delta's network restructuring following its merger with Northwest, we have chosen to implement a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences identi…cation strategy. The general idea underpinning this strategy is to evaluate whether post-merger changes in service frequencies to particular hubs are greater than would otherwise be predicted by timeinvariant hub airport e¤ects and hub-airport-invariant time e¤ects, while controlling also for possible changes in other demand shifters. Speci…cally, we operationalize the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator through the following speci…cation
where Hub i corresponds to the hub airport dummy variable (there are seven such variables in the spoke-airport …xed e¤ects speci…cations, and the corresponding coe¢ cients are all identi…ed since our data include the two carriers' services between airports that are not their hubs, such as Delta Air Lines' ‡ights from Los Angeles to Boston), 30 and Y ear t corresponds to the time controls. 31 The key variables then are the D Hub i Y ear post merger interaction terms, coe¢ cients that should identify the e¤ects we are seeking. Finally, X is the vector of control variables, which includes distance (for those speci…cations where it is identi…ed), HHI, and two demographic measures (population and wages). We de…ne the post-merger time period so as to include all observations from the …rst quarter of 2010 up to and including the …rst quarter of 2011 (end of our sample period).
The focus of our empirical exercise is, therefore, on these seven i coe¢ cients. We are interested in determining the signi…cance of each individual coe¢ cient (a positive sign indicating that a particular hub becomes more important after the merger, and a negative sign indicating a decline in the importance of the hub in the airline's network), and the di¤erences across the coe¢ cients for the various hubs.
As for our control variables, we expect a negative relationship between frequency and route length. On longer routes airlines may prefer to reduce ‡ight frequency and use larger aircraft whose e¢ ciency increases with distance. In addition, airlines may o¤er lower frequencies on long-haul routes since intermodal competition with cars, trains, and ships is weak. A negative distance-frequency relationship has also been reported in previous studies (see Bilotkach et al., 2010) . We expect a negative relationship between ‡ight frequencies and the market concentration index, since airlines will tend to o¤er fewer ‡ights as competition on the route weakens. We expect a positive relationship between population and wages with respect to frequency. Demand should be higher in richer and more populated endpoints, and airlines should increase their ‡ight frequencies when the demand at the endpoint rises.
We need, however, to overcome a number of econometric challenges. First, while the basic speci…cation presented above controls for the time-speci…c e¤ects, market-speci…c and airline-speci…c heterogeneities still need to be addressed. Second, our measure of market concentration is likely to be endogenous. Third, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are likely to be present in our data, necessitating an appropriate correction of the standard errors.
In order to control for market-speci…c and airline-speci…c heterogeneity, the panel nature of our dataset enables the use of a …xed e¤ects model. We have used two approaches here.
First, we estimate route …xed e¤ects: a typical cross-section would be, for example, the route from Los Angeles (LAX) to Atlanta (ATL). Note that, in this model, individual hub airport indicator variables are absorbed by the …xed e¤ects; however, the coe¢ cients of the hub-post-merger interaction variables can be identi…ed. Second, we have estimated a spoke-airport …xed e¤ects model. In this setup, a typical cross-section would include all services from a spoke airport (e.g., Los Angeles). We have identi…ed such cross-sections for every airport in the dataset, except for the seven hub airports. Here, we have a withinvariation that allows us to identify individual hub airport e¤ects.
To deal with the issue of the potential endogeneity of the market concentration variable, we have included one-year lagged HHI instead of the current period HHI in all speci…cations.
It is di¢ cult to make a case for the correlation between lagged concentration and current unobserved shocks. Likewise, in all the estimation results presented, we report standard errors that are robust to both heteroscedasticity across, and autocorrelation within, the respective cross-sections.
Finally, for each of the …xed e¤ects speci…cations described above, we have estimated our models for the entire sample and for the sub-sample of routes originating at spoke airports served by both Delta and Northwest prior to the merger (in 2007). The reason for excluding endpoints not served by both partners to the merger (as a robustness check)
is that we might reasonably expect that, following the merger, Delta would retain services to Northwest hubs from cities not previously served by Delta. For example, International Falls, MN was not served by Delta prior to the merger, with Northwest operating ‡ights to
Minneapolis from this airport. It is not particularly reasonable to suggest that Delta would move this service to Salt Lake City or Cincinnati after acquiring Northwest Airlines, as both Delta hubs are located at some distance from International Falls. At the same time,
were Delta to decide to decrease the importance of MSP as a hub in its network after the merger, we would expect a decrease in ‡ight frequency from MSP to International Falls.
Although this decrease in frequency would a¤ect the magnitude of our estimates, it would not be a direct result of network restructuring, but more of a secondary e¤ect. We can therefore conclude that, by focusing on endpoints served by both partners to the merger in 2007, we focus our attention more directly on network restructuring after the merger.
Results and discussion
Our estimation results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 . Table 3 reports the results of the market …xed e¤ects speci…cation, whereas the outcomes of the spoke-airport …xed e¤ects model are presented in Table 4 . The coe¢ cients of our key variables (hub-airport-post-merger interactions) do di¤er across speci…cation; yet the overall picture is clear. We infer from our results that, after the merger, Delta has boosted somewhat the roles played by Atlanta and Salt Lake City as hubs in the new joint network. The coe¢ cients associated with the interaction terms for these hub airports are positive in all the regressions, and statistically signi…cant in speci…cations that include all routes (except Salt Lake City in the spoke-airport …xed e¤ects regressions). Both airports were the main hubs of Delta Air Lines, which in the process of consolidation was very much in the role of the buyer. In general, the coe¢ cients associated with the interaction terms for the other hub airports are negative and largely statistically signi…cant. Our results clearly indicate that, following the merger, Delta decided to limit the role of Northwest Airlines'former hub airports in its network. This result is especially clear in the spoke-airport …xed e¤ects speci…cations. The importance of the role played by CVG and JFK airports has also been diminished somewhat. According to Fig. 3 , Delta e¤ectively decided to shut down CVG as its hub (our data analysis clearly supports this observation).
Numerically, our estimation results suggest the following. The results reported in Ta- ble 3 indicate that, on average, following the merger Delta Air Lines changed its ‡ight frequencies on routes not involving any of the seven hub airports by between 11-22 per cent more than it did on routes involving former Northwest Airlines hubs. The average di¤erence in the change of frequencies on routes to Atlanta as compared to the background markets is about 5 per cent (or 3 per cent -and therefore not statistically signi…cant -when considering just the sub-set of endpoints served by both carriers before the merger).
Frequencies are between 8 and 9 per cent higher in Salt Lake City than in non-hub airports (see Table 3 ). The diminishing role of Cincinnati airport in the joint network following the merger is self evident in both Tables 3 and 4 . The results in Table 4 are qualitatively similar in part to those presented in Table 3 ; but, the following di¤erences should be stressed.
First, there is no evidence of tra¢ c being diverted from DTW. Second, the changes in ‡ight frequency to SLC are in line with Delta's general policy on non-hub routes after the merger. Third, and somewhat surprisingly, there is evidence of a decline in the importance of JFK as a hub (after 2005, Delta substantially expanded its international network at this gateway, leading us to assume that the carrier would have increased domestic ‡ight frequency commensurately to feed tra¢ c to its international services). Numerically, the e¤ect of the merger on the frequency of ‡ights on routes to MSP and MEM observed in Table 4 is about half that reported in Table 3 . At the same time, Table 4 coe¢ cients on the CVG post-merger interaction variable are about twice as high as they are in Table 3 . Our model also suggested that increased congestion at the main hub might mitigate the concentration of tra¢ c in the main hub. We are not able to provide a clear test of this prediction due to the speci…c characteristics of the underlying data generation process. Our post-merger period is characterized primarily by a fall in demand for air travel, associated with the 2008 …nancial crisis and the subsequent recession that hit the US economy. These events led to a reduction in air tra¢ c delays, a trend that Fig. 4 clearly captures for the seven hubs included in our study. It is therefore quite possible that congestion at the main hubs was simply not great enough for Delta to channel tra¢ c via the secondary gateways.
Concluding remarks
Processes of consolidation are reshaping the global airline industry. At the same time, the development of hub-and-spoke networks, coupled with an increase in global demand for air travel, have brought the issue of airport congestion to the forefront of the policy debate.
While some researchers have suggested that airport congestion is less of a problem than it might initially seem, theoretical studies and their supporting empirical evidence on the self-internalization of airport congestion are more ambiguous in their …ndings.
Our study of network reorganization following a merger is jointly concerned with issues of airline consolidation and airport congestion. We provide both a theoretical framework for analyzing these concerns -paying speci…c attention to congestion at the hubs, and an empirical application to network reorganization -following one of the largest recent airline mergers (Delta-Northwest). Our theoretical framework suggests the possibility of an airline opting to use its secondary hub to relieve congestion at the primary hub, pointing to a particular kind of self-internalization.
In a situation without congestion, our model points to a scenario in which the airline would give additional priority to its primary hub after the merger. This concentration of tra¢ c in the main hub is mitigated in presence of congestion. The empirical analysis suggests that, after the merger, some Delta's hubs (especially Atlanta) are reinforced in the consolidated network while the tra¢ c to former Northwest hubs and to New York's JFK (which was congested prior to the merger) is reduced.
The following caveats should be noted with respect to our theoretical model and the empirical application undertaken here. As regards the theory, we model a consolidation event that falls short of a full-scale merger -the latter presents an intractable modeling exercise. At the same time, analysis of the available literature allows us to suggest that e¤ects of the full merger would be qualitatively similar to the outcome of consolidation we model. We leave this extension for future research since it would require the assumption of partially-served markets, which would complicate the analysis substantially. Furthermore, most of our data are taken from a period of declining demand for air travel where airport congestion problems have had a somewhat diluted in ‡uence in airline network choices.
A potential implication of our analysis is that airfares could increase in the primary hub of the consolidated airline. This increase in airfares could be due to an increase in service quality or/and to a market power e¤ect. In case this hub premium was con…rmed, antitrust authorities should disentangle these two di¤erent e¤ects to decide eventual policy measures.
Notes
1 Brueckner (2001) shows that airline alliances reduce fares in interline city-pair markets while the e¤ect in interhub markets is the opposite. Brueckner (2003) …nds that the presence of codesharing on an international interline itinerary reduces the fare by 8 to 17%, whereas the presence of antitrust immunity (which allows partners to cooperate in the realm of pricing) reduces the fare by 13 to 21%. (2000) consider economies of tra¢ c density. 3 Our theoretical model is related to the literature on vertical product di¤erentiation, pioneered by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) , and Shaked and Sutton (1982) , and summarized by Tirole (1988) . 4 Other studies of frequency choice and scheduling competition include works by Brueckner (2004) and Flores-Fillol (2010). 5 The literature on congestion-pricing does not provide an unambiguous answer to the question of whether a hub operator will self-internalize the congestion externality (see Daniel, 1995 cost per ‡ight, the assumption of decreasing returns is needed to generate sensible results. 9 Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2012) extend this approach by introducing a measure of load factor in the analysis. 10 Brueckner and Flores-FIllol (2007) also analyze the sequential case.
11 Since
, the second-order conditions are satis…ed by inspection. 12 Since
2 (6f 2 + f 1 ) 4 f 2 , the second-order conditions are satis…ed by inspection. 13 Thus, we do not obtain the typical maximal-di¤erentiation result (see Tirole, 1988 ) because the equilibrium f 2 is obtained as an interior solution.
14 The equilibrium ‡ight frequencies are given by f 
10% (*).
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 2.
